The Lachman Fire was allegedly initiated at 12:12 AM on January 1, 2025, by Jonathan Rinderknecht (29 year old Uber Driver). Despite his 12:17 AM report to authorities claiming he was at a distance from the scene, iPhone geolocation data definitively placed the suspect within 30 feet of the ignition point. He has since been formally charged with arson and has plead not guilty.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/united-states-v-jonathan-rinderknecht

Alleged Arsonist Reported Lachman Fire to Fire Department at the Same Time It was Started

In an effort to prioritize the protection of the Milkvetch plant over a mandatory fire break, CA State Parks’ John Ota prohibited the use of a bulldozed containment line. Furthermore, he (John Ota) directed the LAFD to camouflage the burn scar with dry brush to prevent hikers from mistaking it as a new trail. This action effectively laid a blanket of fresh fuel over and near smoldering hot coals, obscuring a significant hazard when the standard procedure would have been to close the park and complete fire containment.

CA State Parks Refused to Close the Park, Prohibited the Fire Containment, and Added Fuel Near Hot Coals

The LAFD declared containment at 4:51 AM on January 1, but field reports confirm that the fire was still active.

https://www.youtube.com/embed/HCTMwEPUFDc

Firefighter, Scott Pike, warned leadership the area was still dangerously hot with hot coals during mop-up operations.

Warnings

Leadership withdrew crews despite reports of smoldering rocks and ground. Fire Captains and Battalion Chiefs ignored Scott Pike's concern that the fire was not completely out and hot coals remained.

Leadership

No thermal imaging was used to confirm the site was safe before departure.

Neglect

Los Angeles Fire Department Knowingly Let the Lachman Fire to Continue to Burn for Six Days

During the six days between fires, a total lack of oversight allowed the fire to survive. Public access remained open, and 911 calls regarding smoke were ignored.

A week of total inaction allowed a preventable reignition to become a catastrophe.

John Ota admitted in a deposition that he never returned to the site, despite explicitly telling LAFD that State Parks would patrol the burn scar.

CA State Parks

Public access remained open, and 911 calls regarding video evidence of active smoke were ignored.

No thermal imaging was used to confirm the site was safe before departure. LAFD failed to re-inspect the site.

LAFD

CA State Parks and LAFD Ignored Evidence of an Active Fire which Became the Palisades Fire

The 117,000,000-gallon reservoir was drained in February 2024 after a tear was discovered in its floating cover. Despite its role as a primary water source for aerial firefighting, it remained empty for nearly a year. The Regulatory Hurdle: The reservoir remained dry because of the competitive bidding process required under the Los Angeles City Charter. This administrative delay prevented the timely hiring of a contractor, forcing firefighting aircraft to travel significantly further for water drops during the fire's expansion.

https://www.circlingthenews.com/facts-about-santa-ynez-reservoir-ignored/

LADWP's Santa Ynez Reservoir Left Drained 11 Months Before Palisades Fire

Power Could Not Be Disconnected: Unlike modernized sections of the grid, LADWP in the Pacific Palisades area lacked a centralized SCADA interface for specific canyon circuits. This gap prevented the 'instant' remote de-energization of lines. Consequently, lines remained live in high-risk zones, serving as a persistent ignition threat when they were most vulnerable to arcing or equipment failure.

https://firerebuild.com/palisades-fire-weather-report-and-analysis/

LADWP's Power Infrastructure Was Outdated and Could Not Be Disconnected

In contrast, Southern California Edison (SCE) in the Malibu area successfully executed their PSPS protocol to eliminate electrical risks:

https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/safety-and-enforcement-division/reports/psps-post-event-reports/2025/20250104sce-psps-post-event-reportdeenergizedfinal.pdf

Issued notifications for Pacific Palisades and Malibu.

Jan 3

De-energization of high-risk circuits completed early morning.

Jan 7

Outages expanded to 413,000 customers to ensure regional safety.

Scope

SCE's Power Infrastructure Could Be Disconnected

Infrastructure hardening was repeatedly stalled by the California Coastal Commission (CCC). Under Order No. CCC-20-CD-03, the CCC penalized LADWP for performing unpermitted mitigation work in Topanga State Park. The Conflict: The CCC required a rigorous Coastal Development Permit (CDP) for any maintenance. This mandate forced upgrades into a plan requiring helicopter-only access to protect sensitive habitats, exponentially increasing costs and delaying the hardening of the grid before the 2025 fire.

https://pacpalicc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/PPCC-Minutes-10.24.24.pdf

California Coastal Commission Prevented LADWP Power Infrastructure Upgrades

A pattern of mismanagement was established in November 2020 when the California Coastal Commission (CCC) ordered LADWP to pay $1.9 million for the illegal bulldozing of environmentally sensitive chaparral in Pacific Palisades. The Impact: This unauthorized clearing destroyed nearly 200 Braunton’s milkvetch plants, a federally protected species under the Endangered Species Act. This event underscored a systemic failure where utility maintenance was conducted without adherence to environmental protocols, leading to a total breakdown in trust between regulators and the utility.

https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-06/ladwp-illegal-bulldozing-pacific-palisades-fine

The Protection of the Milkvetch Weed Prioritizes Plants Over People

While the Franklin Fire burn scar acted as a partial shield, it exposed the extreme fuel loads in adjacent areas of Topanga State Park that remained unmanaged. The 2020 milkvetch scandal created a regulatory environment where mechanical brush clearing was virtually halted. The consequence was a continuous fuel bed of old-growth chaparral and fine fuels that allowed the fire to transition into a high-intensity crown fire that ground crews could not contain.

Unmanaged Brush Resulted in Extreme Fuel Loads in Topanga State Park

The direct result of this unmitigated fuel accumulation and utility vulnerability was the collapse of the private insurance market. By late 2024, major carriers had completely dropped coverage for thousands of residents in Pacific Palisades and Malibu, citing the unmitigated fire risk posed by adjacent parklands. This left homeowners with the California FAIR Plan as their only, often insufficient, option for protection.

https://time.com/7205849/los-angeles-fires-insurance/

https://www.cfpnet.com/key-statistics-data/

Insurance Companies Dropped Policyholders Due to Known, Unmitigated Risks

Media outlets have falsely claimed that the winds driving the Palisades Fire were “unforeseen.” In fact, between January 3 and January 7, 2025, the National Weather Service, Southern California Edison, and the City of Malibu issued at least five public alerts warning of an imminent Santa Ana wind event and “extreme” fire-weather conditions. Although the strongest sustained winds and gusts ultimately fell short of the 60- to 90-mph values mentioned in those forecasts, the advance warnings, covering power shut-offs, road closures, and Red Flag conditions, made it clear that elevated fire danger was anticipated well before the first flames appeared.

Consequently, claims that the wind event, and by extension the fire behavior, was “unforeseen” are contradicted by the documented sequence of official warnings issued days in advance.

There Were Forecasts and Fire Risk Warnings Days in Advance

On the morning of January 6, 2025, the National Weather Service in Los Angeles issued a Red Flag Warning for the Malibu Coast and Santa Monica Mountains. Crucially, this was elevated to a 'Particularly Dangerous Situation' (PDS), a rare designation reserved only for the most extreme fire weather events. Forecasters warned of humidity levels dropping to 5-10% and 'extremely receptive' fuels due to the driest nine-month start to a wet season on record.

National Weather Service: Red Flag Warnings and Particularly Dangerous Situation

NWS models forecasted a 'life-threatening' windstorm. Wind gusts were forecast to reach 60–80 mph in coastal canyons, with mountain ridges anticipated to exceed 98th percentile historical speeds (90–100 mph). The NWS explicitly warned that these winds could topple trees and snap power lines, directly setting the stage for the infrastructure failures that followed.

National Weather Service: Wind Speed Forecasts

The NWS Storm Prediction Center (SPC) issued an Extremely Critical Fire Weather Outlook for Los Angeles County for January 7. This is the highest level of fire weather threat, indicating that any ignition would likely result in uncontrollable, rapid fire spread that would outpace standard suppression tactics.

https://watchers.news/2025/01/07/extremely-critical-fire-weather-for-los-angeles-and-ventura-counties-california/

National Weather Service: Extremely Critical Fire Risk

Burning Index (BI) is a numerical index that indicates the potential difficulty of containing a wildland fire. It is a composite of the Energy Release Component and the Spread Component. A higher BI value suggests that a fire would be more difficult to control, with a greater potential for longer flames and higher intensity. Not Unprecedented Burning Index (BI) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Burning Index for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

https://www.climatologylab.org/gridmet.html

Burning Index (BI) - A composite index of fire intensity and spread potential

Energy Release Component (ERC) represents the total potential heat energy (measured in BTU/square foot) released per unit area at the head of a fire. The ERC is a cumulative index that reflects the moisture content of all live and dead fuels, making it a good indicator of drought conditions. As fuels dry out, the ERC value increases. Not Unprecedented Energy Release Component (ERC) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Energy Release Component for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

Energy Release Component (ERC) - the total potential heat energy released by a fire

Reference Evapotranspiration (ETR) represents the rate at which water would be removed from the soil and plant surface by evaporation and transpiration from a specific standardized reference crop (typically a tall or short cool-season grass). It is measured in inches or millimeters and serves as a baseline for calculating the actual water requirements of various types of vegetation. The ETR is calculated based on weather data such as solar radiation, air temperature, humidity, and wind speed. Not Unprecedented Reference Evapotranspiration (ETR) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Reference Evapotranspiration for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

Reference Evapotranspiration (ETR) - the standardized water loss from a well watered surface

Potential Evapotranspiration (PET) represents the total amount of water that could be evaporated and transpired by a landscape if there were an unlimited supply of water available in the soil. It defines the evaporative demand of the atmosphere, serving as a critical metric for understanding climate intensity and water deficits. When PET significantly exceeds actual precipitation, it indicates high atmospheric demand and a likely drying of available fuel sources. Not Unprecedented Potential Evapotranspiration (PET) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Potential Evapotranspiration for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

Potential Evapotranspiration (PET) - the maximum possible water loss under ideal conditions

100 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture (FM100) is a measure of the moisture content in dead fuels with a diameter of 1 to 3 inches. These fuels take approximately 100 hours to respond to changes in atmospheric moisture. Lower moisture content in these fuels indicates a higher fire risk. Not Unprecedented 100 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture (FM100) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the 100 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

100 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture (FM100) - Moisture content of 1 to 3 inch diameter dead fuels

1000 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture (FM1000) is a measure of the moisture content in large dead fuels with a diameter of 3 to 8 inches. These fuels take approximately 1000 hours (about 42 days) to respond to changes in weather. They are slow to dry out, and while they are not a major factor in fire ignition, they contribute significantly to the heat output and long-term intensity of a fire. Not Unprecedented 1000 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture (FM1000) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the 1000 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

1000 Hour Dead Fuel Moisture (FM1000) - Moisture content of 3 to 8 inch diameter dead fuels

Specific Humidity (SPH) is the mass of water vapor in a unit mass of moist air. Unlike relative humidity, it is not affected by changes in temperature. While less commonly used in direct fire danger indices, it is a key variable for advanced fire weather modeling as it provides a more stable measure of atmospheric moisture. Not Unprecedented Specific Humidity (SPH) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Specific Humidity for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

Specific Humidity (SPH) - The mass of water vapor per unit mass of moist air

Relative humidity (RH) is the amount of water vapor in the air, expressed as a percentage of the maximum amount the air can hold at a specific temperature. Minimum Relative Humidity (RMIN), which typically occurs during the warmest part of the day, is a critical fire weather variable. Lower RH means drier air, which draws moisture from fuels and increases fire danger. Not Unprecedented Minimum Relative Humidity (RMIN) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Minimum Relative Humidity for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

Minimum Relative Humidity (RMIN) - The lowest amount of moisture in the air in a day

Relative humidity (RH) is the amount of water vapor in the air, expressed as a percentage of the maximum amount the air can hold at a specific temperature. Maximum Relative Humidity (RMAX), which occurs at night or in the early morning, can increase fuel moisture and help to moderate fire behavior. Not Unprecedented Maximum Relative Humidity (RMAX) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Maximum Relative Humidity for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

Maximum Relative Humidity (RMAX) - The highest amount of moisture in the air in a day

Mean Vapor Pressure Deficit (VPD) is the difference between the amount of moisture in the air and the maximum amount the air can hold. A high VPD indicates very dry air, which causes plants to lose water more rapidly through transpiration and dries out fuels. A high VPD is directly correlated with higher fire danger. Not Unprecedented Mean Vapor Pressure Deficit (VPD) values recorded immediately preceding the fire at all five gridMET locations within the Palisades Fire perimeter indicate high fire risk. However, these values were not unprecedented. Thousands of days since 1979 have recorded higher risk levels for this area. Furthermore, a climate change analysis of the Mean Vapor Pressure Deficit for each location reveals a fluctuating pattern similar to a heart rate monitor, showing no upward trend.

Mean Vapor Pressure Deficit (VPD) - difference between moisture in the air and what it can hold

On October 3, 2024, while participating in a virtual meeting, Brian Williams used his personal cellphone and a Google Voice application to call his city-issued phone. He then reported to the LAPD and Mayor Karen Bass that he had received a threat from a man angry over the city’s political stances who claimed to have placed a bomb in the City Hall rotunda. As the Deputy Mayor of Public Safety, Williams was the primary liaison for the LAPD, LAFD, and Emergency Management Department. His removal and subsequent administrative leave in December 2024 left these departments without a central civilian coordinator during the critical weeks leading into the January 2025 fire season.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/former-los-angeles-deputy-mayor-public-safety-agrees-plead-guilty-threatening-bomb-la

Los Angeles City Deputy Mayor of Public Safety Made a Fake Bomb Threat

As the Santa Ana wind event materialized in early January 2025, Mayor Karen Bass departed the country on an international trip. This departure occurred without a clear, empowered surrogate in place to manage the looming public safety crisis, leaving a critical decision-making vacuum as the weather thresholds for a catastrophic fire were met.

https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-08/mayor-karen-bass-wildfires-africa-trip

Los Angeles City Mayor Karen Bass Left Country on January 4

Despite explicit PSPS notifications from SCE and Red Flag warnings from the National Weather Service, the LAFD failed to pre-deploy significant brush strike teams or additional aerial assets to the Santa Monica Mountains. Los Angeles Fire Department Chief Kristin Crowley claims that Mayor Karen Bass refused to allow pre-deployment.

https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-02-21/lafds-failure-to-pre-deploy-before-palisades-fire-a-times-investigation

Los Angeles City Fire Department Failed to Pre-Deploy to a Known Fire During a Known Fire Risk

In June 2024, Mayor Karen Bass signed a budget that cut $17.6 million from the LAFD, a significant reduction that followed her office's initial, more aggressive proposal to claw back $23 million from the department. These fiscal maneuvers, aimed at addressing a city-wide deficit, forced a hiring freeze on non-essential positions and pressured fire leadership to identify further requested savings throughout the year. This climate of administrative austerity ultimately crippled operational readiness by deferring critical equipment maintenance, stalling communications upgrades, and preventing the pre-deployment of strike teams—decisions that left the city's defenses hollowed out just six months before the 2025 Palisades Fire.

https://www.foxla.com/news/lafd-budget-cut-karen-bass-2025

Los Angeles City Mayor Cut the LAFD Budget by $17.6 million in June 2024

On January 4, 2025, Mayor Karen Bass departed for Ghana as part of a presidential delegation, despite National Weather Service warnings issued two days prior regarding potential extreme fire conditions. Local resident and business owner John Alle had a phone conversation with the Mayor shortly before her departure in which he specifically warned her about the forecasted Santa Ana wind storm.

https://www.youtube.com/embed/RLac8AqzLhE

Mayor Karen Bass Ignored A Final Warning Before the Fire

In the wake of the March 12, 1928, St. Francis Dam collapse, one of the worst civil engineering failures in American history, LADWP Chief Engineer William Mulholland did not deflect blame onto subordinates or weather conditions. During the subsequent coroner's inquest, Mulholland famously took the stand and declared, 'I envy the dead,' expressing profound remorse for the lives lost and stating that the responsibility for the catastrophe rested solely on his shoulders.

https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Mulholland

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/occasions-i-envy-dead-st-francis-dam-disaster-180954543/

William Mulholland Accepted Full Responsibility Following the 1928 St. Francis Dam Disaster

The definitive historical record of the Palisades Fire written by Michael Kureth.

Palisades Fire

The Definitive Historical Record